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This article examines the utilization of knowledge transferred between sending and receiving 
subsidiaries within multinational enterprises. A model was developed and tested on 169 
specific knowledge transfer projects. The model explains the utilization of knowledge subject 
to transfer in terms of hierarchical governance tool efficacy and lateral relationships within 
the multinational enterprise. The results show that headquarters’ involvement during 
knowledge development does not have any significant impact on subsequent knowledge 
utilization in the receiving units and, in fact, hierarchical governance forms have a negative 
impact on knowledge utilization. However, lateral relationships are positive stimuli to 
building subsidiary capabilities in the knowledge transfer process that enhance receiving unit 
knowledge utilization. Copyright © 2015 Strategic Management Society. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In this article, we analyze knowledge transfer effectiveness between sending and receiving 
subsidiaries within multinational enterprises (MNEs) in terms of utilization of transferred 
knowledge at the receiving unit. Viewing and measuring knowledge transfer as a discrete 
event, rather than an aggregate of knowledge in- and outflows enables teasing out the 
knowledge transfer effectiveness in terms of use and adoption at the receiver.1 This is an 
important contribution of our study, as only knowledge that has been adopted and is used can 
have a genuine impact on capability development. The conceptual framework of this article 
builds on the knowledge-based view and integrates both hierarchical governance tools and 
lateral relationships for understanding knowledge transfer effectiveness. The knowledge-
based  view highlights integrating isolated knowledge (Almeida, Song, and Grant, 2002; Foss 
and Pedersen, 2004; Song, Almeida, and Wu, 2003). We contribute to the knowledge-based  
view by making manifest hierarchical and lateral factors facilitating, or impeding, firms’ de 
facto knowledge integration. Put differently, the knowledge-based view is extended by 
explaining antecedents to the use and adoption of geographically dispersed knowledge by 
focusing on effective knowledge transfer. 
Given knowledge’s prominence as a fundamental competitive resource, a key firm 
activity is knowledge governance, that is, the development and leverage of knowledge 
throughout the firm (Argote and Ingram, 2000; Foss, 2007). Managers at different firm levels 
orchestrate knowledge processes with varying degrees of difficulty: for example, the more 
geographically dispersed the firm is, and the more dissimilar the activities of its subsidiaries 
are, the greater the obstacle to knowledge transfer (Agrawal, Kapur, and McHale, 2008; 
1 Effectiveness reflects the utilization of knowledge that has been transferred to a receiving unit. As the adoption 
and use of transferred knowledge is what influences organizational learning, this is the goal when transferring 
knowledge between units in an MNE.  The 'cost efficiency,' that is, the number of people, hours, and amount of 
financial resources employed in the transfer process, can, of course, compromise the benefits of adopting and 
using the transferred knowledge, but it does not in itself influence organizational capabilities. Previous research 
has found that knowledge transfer drives performance, but the issue of use and adoption has been left relatively 
unexplored. 
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Tallman and Phene, 2007). The MNE, which can be viewed as a bundle of resources that are 
geographically dispersed (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Penrose 1959), therefore constitutes a 
particularly important laboratory in which to study knowledge governance (Foss, 2006). 
Geographically dispersed knowledge and associated sources may benefit the MNE due to 
location heterogeneity, but, at the same time, it may be difficult to integrate (Foss and 
Pedersen, 2004). However, a core idea of the knowledge-based view is that MNEs can 
transfer this knowledge efficiently (Kogut and Zander, 1993), but at the same time it may be 
difficult for the recipient to utilize the transferred knowledge effectively (Barney, 1991). This 
conundrum is rarely discussed within the knowledge-based view; by focusing on the use and 
adoption of transferred knowledge, we address this gap in the literature. 
The struggle between internal consistency and local adaptation is apt to be more 
pronounced in MNEs as compared to domestic firms, thus complicating the knowledge 
transfer process. MNE managers at both the subsidiary and the headquarters level can employ 
different governance mechanisms to influence knowledge transfer processes (Foss, Husted, 
and Michailova, 2010)—hence, the need to understand the various tools at the managers’ 
disposal. We focus on specific knowledge transfer projects with particular reference to the 
role of headquarters in the process—the relationship between subsidiaries and specific 
managerial actions taken to ensure effective knowledge transfer (Foss and Pedersen, 2004; 
Grant, 1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993; Martin and Salomon, 2003; Szulanski and 
Jensen, 2006). 
 Firms are not only important and efficient governance structures, but are also a locus for 
learning (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; Madhok 1996, 1997; Tallman and Chacar, 2011; Teece, 
1990) and cultivate routines as coordinative devices (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Williamson, 
1999). Previous research has primarily focused on characteristics of the knowledge 
transferred or subsidiaries’ absorptive capacity , that is, cognitive aspects (Mahnke and 
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Pedersen, 2004), whereas hierarchical intervention has attracted less attention, especially at 
the subsidiary level. Relational governance, defined as, 'a social institution that governs and 
guides exchange partners on the basis of cooperative norms and collaborative activities' 
(Poppo, Zhou, and Zenger, 2008: 1197) seems to be a promising perspective in analyzing the 
utilization of transferred knowledge, i.e., transfer effectiveness, as it encompasses hierarchical 
governance tools and lateral relationships.  
 This article also addresses the important question, discussed by Foss and Pedersen 
(2004), of how MNE managers at both the subsidiary and headquarters level can orchestrate 
knowledge transfer activities in the MNE network and how this affects knowledge transfer 
effectiveness. The link between organizational processes and knowledge transfer is still 
under-researched (Foss, 2006). This article connects actions taken by headquarters with more 
micro-features associated with subsidiaries engaged in knowledge transfer, that is, the social 
structures of inter-subsidiary relationships (Szulanski, Cappetta, and Jensen, 2004) that can 
help explain knowledge transfer effectiveness. While extant research has looked at knowledge 
transfer in MNEs from different viewpoints, most has looked at 'flows of knowledge' as an 
aggregated quota that is transferred, which makes it inherently difficult to tease out the actual 
effect of the knowledge transfer effort at the recipient unit. The focus on flows of knowledge 
obscures the success of individual transfer projects in terms of adoption and use in the 
receiving units. It also makes the influence of different knowledge governance tools on 
knowledge transfer effectiveness ambiguous. In the present study, we address this important 
gap in the existing knowledge transfer literature. 
The findings are based on a questionnaire administered through structured face-to-face 
interviews with subsidiary managers involved in 169 specific intra-MNE knowledge transfer 
projects. The knowledge transaction was used as the unit of analysis (Foss, 2007). The 
specificity of the data from these 169 transfer projects adds to the quality of the findings, 
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since research has found that MNEs apply different control strategies depending on the 
context in which the subsidiaries operate (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994). By looking at specific 
transfer projects, a fine-grained understanding of both hierarchical and lateral relationships is 
attained, thereby contributing to an increased understanding of knowledge governance and the 
knowledge-based view. This is directly related to Grant’s (1996) conceptualization of the firm 
as a knowledge integrator. 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: the theoretical background is 
outlined in the next section. This is followed by a section outlining five hypotheses that 
address how hierarchical governance tools and lateral relationships affect the utilization of 
transferred knowledge. Subsequently, the data and methods are presented, followed by the 
results of the study. The results are then discussed with limitations pointed out and 
suggestions made for future research.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Transfer of knowledge  
Knowledge management is at the forefront of MNE research (cf. Agrawal et al., 2008; Grant, 
1996; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993; Szulanski, 1996; 
Tallman and Phene, 2007). The MNE is conceptualized as a superior vehicle for knowledge 
development and transfer because it is a social community (Kogut and Zander, 1993) rather 
than a market transactor of knowledge. Teece (1986) conceptualized innovations as bearers of 
knowledge. Thus, in this article, knowledge is captured by analyzing different innovations 
that embody knowledge. The transfer of knowledge is an attempt to close gaps between what 
is known and what is currently being used throughout the organization (Cool, Dierickx, and 
Szulanski, 1997; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer and Sutton, 2000; Repenning, 2002). 
This may be described as 'additive complementarity' (Buckley and Carter, 1999). Still, the 
knowledge transfer activity needs to be managed and coordinated, that is, governed. In 
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essence, this suggests a framework where both the formal power of headquarters and the 
informal social relationships formed by subsidiaries—where much of the actual network 
influence may reside (Forsgren, Holm, and Johanson, 2005)—are taken into account. 
The rationale behind knowledge transfer in MNEs arises because it is costly to develop 
new knowledge and the organization has an interest in making use of existing knowledge 
elsewhere in the MNE, although transfer also has a cost (Teece, 1977). This is in accordance 
with Penrose’s (1959) assertion that the competence of a firm is connected to its ability to 
leverage its resources. By transferring knowledge, the performance observed at one location 
in the organization can potentially be enhanced in another location, either by generating new 
knowledge or by economizing on existing knowledge (Schulz, 2001; Szulanski et al., 2004). 
This implies that there is both cost and gain from knowledge transfer. The cost-benefit 
balance is dependent on the transfer process performance; more specifically, echoing Teece 
(1977) and Penrose (1959), the transferred knowledge has to be utilized at the recipient. If 
transferred knowledge is not used, it seems inept to engage in transfer at all, since costs are 
incurred but no effect is achieved in terms of upgrading the competencies and competitive 
advantage in the receiving unit. Making sure that what is developed in one location is 
transferred to another is core for knowledge governance and the knowledge-based view, and 
usage may lead to an improved competitive position for the receiving unit. 
Knowledge transfer performance 
Extant research has by and large focused on knowledge transfer measured as an outflow from 
a sender or inflow to a receiver (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Haas and Hansen, 2005; 
Norderhaven and Harzing, 2009; Schulz, 2001). However, this literature offers limited 
insights as to whether the knowledge transferred is being implemented and used at the 
receiving subsidiary. There have been some voices arguing that this might not be the case 
(Argote and Ingram, 2000; Kostova, 1999), for example, knowledge being ceremonially 
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adopted (Kostova and Roth, 2002). Hence, our knowledge is limited regarding whether or not 
knowledge really is adopted by the receiving subsidiary. In this respect, our understanding of 
knowledge transfer effectiveness is underdeveloped.  
Studying knowledge transfer performance requires investigating individual transfer 
projects. We capture individual project performance variance and elucidate the associated 
underlying reasons in an approach similar to Szulanski (1996) and Kostova and Roth (2002), 
where knowledge transfer was suggested to be a distinct experience related to specific 
projects. In this article, knowledge transfer effectiveness is defined as a distinct measure 
related to the receiving subsidiary’s knowledge implementation and usage (Ciabuschi, 
Dellestrand, and Kappen, 2011a; Kostova, 1999; Leonard-Barton and Sinha, 1993). As 
proposed by Foss (2007), we use the specific knowledge transaction as the unit of analysis in 
this study. 
Organizational processes at different levels can affect MNE knowledge transfer 
performance in general. Though efficiency and effectiveness are inter-related, this article 
focuses on effectiveness rather than efficiency, that is, the transfer cost (Daft, 1992). 
Knowledge that is used by the recipient is key, since it is only then that the transferred 
knowledge has implications for the functioning of the recipient subsidiary. The following two 
sections elaborate on hierarchical governance and lateral relationships by focusing on the 
discrete event of individual knowledge transfer projects. Both are distinct organizational 
governance dimensions and do not exclude the other—rather they are complementary forces 
influencing the degree of the receiving unit’s transferred knowledge utilization.2 The 
variables included in this analysis are associated with key concepts in the discussion of 
hierarchy and lateral relationships and illuminate the emerging knowledge governance 
2 Indeed, there is a multitude of knowledge management tools available, but for our model, we emphasize the 
direct interventions linked to a specific knowledge transfer project and not other activities that may be ongoing 
within the MNE, such as employee training, conferences, acculturation, etc. These are activities that may be 
initiated by headquarters for fostering a general positive knowledge-sharing environment, but since they do not 
directly relate to the transfer project, we do not consider these activities in this study. 
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approach (Foss, 2007; Grandori, 2001). Our approach is also consistent with the horizontal 
and vertical dimensions of the knowledge-based view (Grant, 1996). 
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Hierarchical governance and knowledge transfer 
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1990) and Birkinshaw (2001) argued that headquarters is potentially 
very influential in managing knowledge flows between MNE units. Headquarters can be 
thought of as a knowledge webmaster (Tallman and Koza, 2010), occupying a special 
position within the MNE network as the unit with formal authoritative power. Headquarters 
has a holistic role that entails a strategic responsibility to identify needs and solutions in the 
organization, i.e., top management has an important role in identifying, creating, and sharing 
knowledge (Markides, 2002; Markides and Williamson, 1994), which relates to the transfer 
process in filling gaps where knowledge resides at other organization locations. For 
headquarters, this involves participating in subsidiary-level activities, as well as using formal 
monitoring and evaluation criteria. The level of hierarchical involvement in subsidiary 
activities is not equal for all organizations and, even within one organization, the degree to 
which governance mechanisms are employed can vary (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994); that is, 
there is a unique configuration of the headquarters-subsidiary control problem in every 
relationship. 
Headquarters’ role during innovation development  
Headquarters’ involvement can affect how knowledge—and the subsidiary developing the 
knowledge—is perceived within the organization. If headquarters pays attention to specific 
innovation projects (Williamson, 1992), a corollary is that the subsidiaries related to this 
project gain visibility, receive legitimacy (Ambos, Andersson, and Birkinshaw, 2010), and are 
perceived to be important players (Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm, 2007). This is also true 
for the specific knowledge developed, i.e., not only is the subsidiary developing the 
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knowledge perceived as important, but so is the specific knowledge per se. Consequently, 
innovations subject to transfer that have received headquarters’ attention through its direct 
involvement during the development stage are, by definition, allocated resources and 
prioritized by headquarters (Ciabuschi, Dellestrand, and Martín Martín, 2011b). By involving 
itself in the innovation’s development, for instance by specifying requests, the outcome of the 
development process is affected and the developed innovation is more suitable for other MNE 
subsidiaries. Headquarters’ involvement in development also encompasses adding specific 
competencies and knowledge as well as actively participating in the development process 
(Ciabuschi et al., 2011b). By doing so, headquarters steers knowledge development toward 
internal consistency with the result that it is easier for a receiving subsidiary to adopt and 
integrate the knowledge transferred to it (Schulz, 2001; Yang, Mudambi, and Meyer, 2008). 
For headquarters, involvement in development indicates a commitment that is likely to be 
reflected in the subsequent transfer and signals that the innovation should be utilized at a 
recipient once transferred. Also, if headquarters has influenced the outcome of the 
development process via its involvement by, for instance, specifying requests, this will 
increase the perceived relevance of the knowledge subject to transfer (Yang et al., 2008) and, 
as a corollary, positively influence the adoption and use of the transferred knowledge. 
Consequently, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Greater headquarters involvement in the 
development of an innovation will positively affect the utilization of the 
transferred knowledge. 
 
Headquarters control and monitoring of knowledge transfer processes 
One of headquarters’ objectives in upgrading subsidiary capabilities is to make sure that 
knowledge is transferred between them (Dellestrand and Kappen, 2012). If knowledge is not 
transferred within the MNE, opportunities may be lost and the organization may lose an 
advantage. The role of headquarters in MNEs has been conceptualized as avoiding the 
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negative (losses), as well as taking on an entrepreneurial role (value creation) (Foss, 1997). 
Headquarters can be thought of as an MNE network orchestrator (Dhanaraj and Parkhe, 
2006), where it identifies critical knowledge and points out transfer opportunities to 
subsidiaries. This resonates with headquarters taking action and becoming a visible hand 
within the MNE by issuing commands without directly controlling the transfer process 
(Tallman and Koza, 2010). Such hierarchical governance can create ill feelings among the 
subsidiaries and instigate ceremonial adoption of knowledge (Ghoshal and Moran, 1996; 
Kostova and Roth, 2002). The parties engaged in the transfer process may feel forced into a 
costly and time-consuming activity and, consequently, perceive little value in it, which 
negatively influence the process of adoption and integration at the receiving unit. 
Moreover, the knowledge that headquarters possesses regarding the subsidiaries’ local 
business network is often shallow (Forsgren et al., 2005). If headquarters actively involves 
itself in knowledge transfer and governs this process by formal demands and evaluation 
systems, it can be perceived as ignorant because of its lack of relationship-specific knowledge 
This can create a negative disposition toward adopting and using the knowledge at the 
subsidiary level (Forsgren, 2008). Hence, the effects of headquarters governance mechanisms 
may be detrimental and social activities at the subsidiary level become important for 
knowledge transfer (Kostova and Roth, 2003). This negative side of headquarters’ governance 
could be mitigated by the fact that it possesses formal power to exert influence over 
subsidiaries, and direct transactional involvement of headquarters can mean additional 
resources for the subsidiary. However, even if headquarters provides a knowledge-directing 
function within the MNE, it may be biased toward cost efficiency and not effectiveness of the 
transfer processes. This is because cost efficiency is a dimension more easily measured and 
monitored at a distance (Kostova and Roth, 2002). A focus on efficiency can be detrimental 
for utilization of the transferred knowledge since adoption takes more time and understanding 
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than simply transferring knowledge in a cost-efficient manner (Ciabuschi et al., 2011a). In 
line with this reasoning, the following is suggested:  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Greater use of formal hierarchical governance 
tools by headquarters in the innovation transfer process will 
negatively affect the utilization of the transferred knowledge. 
 
Subsidiary control mechanisms in knowledge transfer 
One way to govern the transfer process is by using expatriates from the sending subsidiary to 
the receiving subsidiary, which can facilitate lateral relationship building (Minbaeva, 2008). 
The use of expatriates can further facilitate knowledge flows between the technology-sending 
subsidiary and other MNE units (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000) and is one way of governing 
knowledge transfer processes laterally (Edström and Galbraith, 1977). Expatriates from the 
sending subsidiary collaborate with colleagues at the receiving subsidiary, and this will 
facilitate the creation of communities of practice and the establishment of social ties that 
facilitate learning (Tallman and Chacar, 2011). Consequently, expatriates can facilitate the 
process of integrating new knowledge at the receiving subsidiary and help overcome 
problems during the transfer phase (Tsang, 1999). Using expatriates specifically for a 
knowledge transfer project is costly and can be seen as an investment by the organization, but 
should have a positive impact on the understanding and adoption of the knowledge subject to 
transfer. Put differently, the communities of practice established by individuals (e.g., 
expatriates) also have implications for establishing networks of practices between subsidiaries 
(Tallman and Chacar, 2011). This is likely to positively influence knowledge transfer. 
Furthermore, expatriates can understand the value added of the transferred knowledge, 
have direct experience in handling the knowledge, and help explain complicated tacit 
knowledge dimensions when it is used at the receiving unit (Björkman, Barner-Rasmussen, 
and Li, 2004; Moran 2005). Hence, the following hypothesis can be formulated: 
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Hypothesis 3 (H3): Greater use of expatriates from the sending 
subsidiary to the receiving subsidiary during the transfer will 
positively affect the utilization of transferred knowledge. 
 
Subsidiary networks and knowledge transfer 
In the intraorganizational MNE network, indistinct formal boundaries exist between 
subsidiaries (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990), and subsidiaries develop (more informal) 
collaborations and cooperate with each other (Andersson et al., 2007; Forsgren et al., 2005). 
Previous (voluntarily) developed relationships between subsidiaries have, due to prior 
exchange and collaboration, enhanced the social capital between them (Tsai, 2000). Social 
capital provides cohesiveness and makes the firm strive toward a common goal (Adler and 
Kwon, 2002). Value is generated by building social capital due to the facilitation of the 
exchange process of resources and through providing access to extended network 
relationships (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Moran, 2005; Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). This 
implies that social capital entails both personal connections and network structures at the unit 
level that often transcend organizational boundaries (Granovetter, 1985; Moran, 2005; 
Mäkelä, Andersson, and Seppäle, 2012) and help govern knowledge transfer. 
In established relationships, where the actors have previously cooperated, the perceived 
risk of engaging in a new project is decreased since knowledge pertaining to the functioning 
of the relationship has already been built, behavior has been experienced, and trust has been 
developed (Inkpen and Tsang, 2005; Uzzi, 1997). Further, processes and routines are in place 
for future interaction, which will facilitate collaboration and cooperation (Kostova and Roth, 
2003) and thereby knowledge transfer, connecting to what constitutes 'relational governance' 
(Poppo et al., 2008). Through social ties, a common identity is created (Håkansson and 
Snehota, 1995) and since many knowledge transfer processes are complicated to explain 
during the transfer phase, this will take time and is more likely to be effective in a relationship 
where a closeness between the individuals partaking in the transfer exists (Moran, 2005). 
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Expressed differently, social ties between a sender and a receiver will facilitate the utilization 
of the knowledge transferred. Moreover, in a relationship where the actors know each other, 
the search process for relevant knowledge is facilitated. Consequently, the knowledge 
transferred in such a relationship will entail more relevant knowledge for the receiver; and the 
sender will be more understanding of the needs of the receiver. This will affect the utilization 
of transferred knowledge positively (Szulanski et al., 2004; Yang et al., 2008). This line of 
reasoning implies that social capital can be built by repeated interaction (Buckley and Casson, 
1988); if the transfer partners are experienced, their capabilities for conducting such processes 
are enhanced (Cyert and March, 1963; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000; Zollo and Winter, 2002) 
and routines are established for transferring and incorporating knowledge. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): An established relationship between the sending 
and receiving subsidiaries will positively affect the utilization of 
transferred knowledge. 
 
From the logic about relationships, it follows that relationship building between the sending 
and the receiving units enhances social capital, where social capital is understood as, 'the 
relational resources attainable by individual actors through networks of social relationships' 
(Tsai, 2000:  927). More specifically, relationship building within MNEs corresponds to 
knowledge management tools such as temporary training, forming task forces, and face-to-
face meetings. However, it is important to keep in mind that this study focuses on actions 
related to specific knowledge transfer projects and associated relationship-building efforts. 
This relates to utilization and effectiveness because the opportunity to explain complex issues 
and reduce errors during the transfer process increases. As such, building relationships will 
facilitate the learning and the understanding of the knowledge transferred (Lane and Lubatkin, 
1998; Tallman and Phene, 2007). In other words, the actors have a common basic 
understanding of the knowledge subject to transfer, which facilitates adoption and use of the 
 14 
transferred knowledge (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1993). Social interaction will also increase 
the knowledge transparency, which further facilitates integration and adoption of knowledge 
(Tallman and Phene, 2007). Consequently the following hypothesis is proposed: 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Relationship building between the sending and 
receiving subsidiary will positively affect the utilization of transferred 
knowledge. 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
The data used in this research was collected from 2002 to 2005 and covers 169 intra-MNE 
innovation transfer projects in great detail. Innovations in subsidiaries were identified through 
snowball sampling, which is appropriate when the population is difficult to define and no 
comprehensive listing exists (Hair et al., 2006). The data can be traced back to 72 innovation 
development projects hosted by 63 subsidiaries belonging to 23 different MNEs 
headquartered in the U.S. and Europe. The sending subsidiaries span 14 countries and the 
receivers 31 countries.3 Different industries are represented in the sample, for example, 
manufacturing, telecommunications, transportation, and the steel industry. The innovation 
selection criterion was based on the novelty and specific value to the organization. This 
follows the 2005 OECD definition of innovations, that is, 'the implementation of a new or 
significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a 
new organizational method in business practices, workplace organization or external relations' 
(OECD, 2005: 47). This selection was done by the innovating/developing subsidiary. 
Moreover, the innovations had to have the potential of being transferred and they also had to 
have been completed one to 10 years prior to the interview. Sampling innovations that have 
transfer potential means that the dataset contains some innovations that have not been subject 
to transfer. These innovations are excluded in the present analysis.  
3 More specifically, the senders are located in: Sweden, Taiwan, Italy, France, the U.K., the U.S., Germany, 
Belgium, Finland, Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. 
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 One potential sample bias is that it only contains successful innovations, in terms of 
having been developed. However, given the question at hand, this bias is almost intrinsic 
since the transfer of unsuccessful innovations is highly unlikely and would not add anything 
to the MNE’s competitive advantage. 'Successful' in this sense does not imply subsequent 
market success. 
The data was collected through face-to-face interviews on site at the subsidiaries where 
the respondent answered a structured questionnaire—an approach similar to surveys, but with 
the advantage of being able to target the respondent in person and knowing exactly who 
answers the questionnaire. The respondents had been involved in the innovation development 
and were usually R&D managers, project managers, or subsidiary CEOs. In relation to the 
transfer projects, even if the data was collected at the sending subsidiary, the innovations had 
been transferred to more than one receiver (on average, the innovations in our sample were 
transferred to 2.35 receivers). This allows respondents to compare, for instance, transfer 
effectiveness across projects. The questionnaire had been pretested in two pilot interviews, 
and minor changes were made in order to eliminate ambiguous questions and phrasings as 
well as to exclude erroneous indicators. By having access to managers with detailed 
knowledge of the specific innovations, a deeper understanding could be gained  (Denrell, 
Arvidsson, and Zander, 2004), and we could discuss the questions with the respondents. This 
approach allows targeting the appropriate respondent and detecting inconsistencies in the 
answers during the interview, hence increasing reliability and face validity of the data. 
Measures 
The advice of Boyd, Gove, and Hitt (2005) was followed and single-measure indicators were 
avoided. Multiple indicators were used in both the dependent and independent variables. This 
approach minimizes measurement error, is parsimonious, and offers a multifaceted 
representation of the underlying construct (Hair et al., 2006). Additionally, as recommended 
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by Cox (1980), seven-point Likert-type scales were used to obtain the data on innovation 
transfer in MNEs. Besides the subjective estimations by the respondents, distance measures 
using secondary data, patenting, and size were included as control variables. The constructs 
were identified in an iterative process, where coefficient alphas as well as theoretical issues 
were considered (Churchill, 1979; Nunnally, 1978). The constructs were theoretically valid 
and empirically verified. Subsequently, factor analysis was used in order to confirm the 
constructs’ discriminant validity. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable—knowledge transfer effectiveness—reflects the adoption and use of 
the transferred knowledge within the receiving unit. The responses focused on circumstances 
related to completeness, ease, and timeliness of the adoption and use and follows previous 
recommendations and discussions in the literature (Kostova and Roth, 2002; Leonard-Barton 
and Sinha, 1993; Repenning, 2002; Szulanski 1996). Compared to earlier studies 
concentrating on the extent of knowledge flows between firm subsidiaries, our method of 
depicting transfer performance is the degree of transfer effectiveness in terms of investigating 
the actual adoption and use of the innovation at the receiving subsidiary (Ciabuschi et al., 
2011a). This reflects key ideas in the knowledge-based view (Grant, 1996) and reflects 
utilization of transferred knowledge. 
Transfer performance effectiveness is measured as a four-item construct where the 
respondents were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) 
whether: (1) the performance of the innovation transfer was very satisfactory; (2) the 
counterpart adopted the innovation very quickly; and (3) the innovation has been very easy to 
adopt by this counterpart. One final item was included in this construct and was measured on 
a similar scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very high): (4) to what extent the innovation transfer 
has been completed. The internal construct reliability was good, with a coefficient alpha of 
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0.817, exceeding the recommended level of 0.7 (Nunnally, 1978). These four items were 
summed and averaged to form the dependent variable in the statistical analysis. The 
dependent variable is distinct from other variables in the analysis, as Table 1 shows.4 
Independent variables 
The first dimension of headquarters’ subsidiary-level influence is whether or not they have 
been involved in the innovation development of the innovation subject to transfer and build 
on and extend the attention-based view (Bouquet, Morrison, and Birkinshaw, 2009; Ocasio, 
1997). Headquarters’ involvement in innovation development is captured in a four-item 
construct where the respondents were asked to indicate, on a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 
7 (totally agree) whether: (1) the MNE HQ has participated closely in developing this 
innovation; (2) the MNE HQ has brought competence of use for the development of this 
innovation; (3) the MNE HQ has been important through specifying requests; and (4) the 
MNE HQ has taken important initiatives for developing the innovation. The four indicators 
were summed and averaged in order to form the construct used in the regression analysis. 
Internal construct reliability was high, with a coefficient alpha of 0.908. 
The use of formal hierarchical governance tools and sanctions by headquarters is 
captured by four items and is similar to measures employed by Gates and Egelhoff (1986) and 
Tsai (2002). The respondents were asked to indicate, on a scale from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 
(totally agree), to what extent: (1) the MNE HQ has formally instructed you to share this 
innovation with the counterpart; and (2) the transfer of the innovation has occurred without 
any sanctions by HQ with the counterpart (reversed). Moreover, the respondents were asked 
to indicate on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) whether the transfer of the 
4 Since the research project and data collection effort aimed at capturing both MNE subsidiary development and 
transfer activities, the primary data collection target was the developing/sending subsidiary. We worked under 
the assumption that respondents involved in development and transfer of the specific projects will have a good 
knowledge of associated structures and processes, and the face-to-face data collection increased data quality. 
Subsequent to the initial data collection, we collected data from 23 receivers. We have matched data 
corresponding to the item 'the performance of the innovation transfer was very satisfactory,' and when 
performing a t-test between answers, no significant differences can be found. This signals that senders and 
receivers estimate the transfer performance similarly. 
 18 
                                                 
innovation was driven by:  (1) requirement from HQ; and (2) HQ evaluation system. These 
four items were summed and averaged to form the construct. The coefficient alpha of this 
construct is 0.632, which is below the recommendation as set by Nunnally (1978). Since this 
construct employs relatively few indicators, it is not uncommon to find that alpha tests, given 
that they generally are conservative, return a lower coefficient than the recommended level. 
Reliability increases the more items a scale contains (Nunnally, 1978). With the same average 
inter-item correlation and the inclusion of additional variables, the alpha value will increase 
(Carmines and Zeller, 1979). When a low alpha is found, it is appropriate to check the mean 
inter-item correlation (MIC). The optimal range for the MIC is 0.2 to 0.4 (Briggs and Cheek, 
1986). The MIC for this construct was 0.295, thus meeting the stipulated criterion. This, plus 
the construct being identified as distinct from others in a principal component factor analysis 
(see Table 1), where both the factor loadings and communalities extracted for the items were 
adequate, indicate the appropriateness of using this construct. 
The use of subsidiary expatriates is reflected in a two-item construct and builds on 
Gupta and Govindarajan’s (2000) measure and Galbraith’s (1973) integrative mechanisms. 
The respondents were asked to indicate, on a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very high): 
to what extent, with regard to the transfer of the innovation, exchange of managers was used. 
The respondents were also asked to indicate, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much): to 
what extent the transfer of the innovation was driven by moving personnel between the 
developer and the receiver. The indicators were added and averaged to form the scale. A 
coefficient alpha of 0.743 indicates good internal construct reliability. 
Established relationships, that is, dyadic transfer experience in the sender-receiver 
relationship, is a two-item construct where the respondents indicated to what extent, (besides 
the focal innovation discussed during the data collection) on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very much): (2) they previously had cooperated with the receiver; and (2) they previously 
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had shared knowledge. The indicators were summed and averaged in order to form the 
construct, which had a coefficient alpha of 0.738. This construct builds on literature 
highlighting experience’s role in knowledge transfer (Ingram and Baum, 1997). 
Finally, relationship building between the sending and receiving subsidiaries during the 
innovation transfer was captured using a three-item construct drawing on Ghoshal and 
Bartlett’s (1988) framework concerning socialization mechanisms, as well as on the indicators 
used by Persson (2006). The respondents were asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (not at all) 
to 7 (very high) the level of use of: (1) temporary training at partner sites; (2) cross-unit 
teams, project groups, etc.; and (3) face-to-face meetings. The indicators were summed and 
averaged. The construct has adequate internal reliability, with a coefficient alpha of 0.732. 
Control variables 
In order to more fully specify the model, a number of control variables were introduced. Age 
was included since older subsidiaries are more established in their business networks and 
have a tendency to be more autonomous (Forsgren, 1990); they can also exhibit a higher 
innovative capability (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Foss and Pedersen, 2002). To control for 
age, the logarithm of the number of years the subsidiary had been operating on the market 
was included in the regression equation.  
 Size, measured as the natural logarithm of the number of developing subsidiary 
employees, is used as a proxy for many subsidiary-related characteristics. Research has shown 
that large subsidiaries have greater intrafirm bargaining power (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004), 
and size can also affect knowledge transfer even if the knowledge has a low relevance (Yang 
et al., 2008). Research has also used size as one indicator for valuable knowledge stock, 
which can be of greater overall value for the MNE (Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000).  
 Basic research is captured with the help of a dummy variable. If the subsidiary 
conducted research considered to be core, the variable was coded '1;' if the subsidiary did not 
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conduct any basic research, the observation was coded '0.' Knowledge developed by a 
subsidiary performing core activities is likely to be more easily adopted, building on 
absorptive capacity logic. In order to control whether knowledge-sharing activities are 
stimulated in the MNE, this was included as a single-item variable. The respondents were 
asked to indicate, on a scale of 1 to 7, how important knowledge sharing was in the 
performance evaluation made of them. This has been shown to have a positive impact on 
knowledge transfer flows in previous studies (Björkman et al., 2004). To control for the target 
subsidiary’s knowledge-receiving ability, we employed a measure capturing unit similarity of 
the innovation transfer partners. This is a two-item construct capturing how similar the sender 
and receiver are regarding technological and organizational features. The respondents were 
asked to indicate, with regard to the receiver, on a scale of 1 (totally disagree) to 4 (neither) to 
7 (totally agree) whether:  (1) technical difference makes the transfer problematic; and (2) 
organizational difference makes the transfer problematic.5 The indicators were summed and 
averaged to form the construct. Internal reliability was good, with a coefficient alpha of 0.738. 
A dummy variable indicating whether the innovation subject to transfer was patented or not 
was included in the model. The potential ease with which the knowledge might be transferred 
connects to codification, which can be proxied by patenting (Tallman and Chacar, 2011). 
Additionally, distances and differences between countries in which subsidiaries are located 
may influence knowledge transfer. Therefore, we controlled for distances in a number of 
dimensions. The geographic distance between the locations was calculated for each transfer 
project. The number of kilometers was calculated using MapCrow. This measure was 
transformed into the natural log of the distance measure and is consistent with the approach of 
other studies using geographic distance (e.g., Hansen and Lovås, 2004). Cultural distance was 
controlled for by using Kogut and Singh’s 1988 index, expressed as: 
5 These items were reverse coded in order to capture the similarities between the subsidiaries involved in the 
knowledge transfer. 
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         4 
CDj=∑ {(Iij – IiN)2/Vi}/4 , 
                        i=1 
 
where CD is the cultural distance between the subsidiary host countries, Iij is the score 
of the receiving subsidiary’s country on the ith dimension, and IiN is the score of the sending 
subsidiary’s country in this dimension. Vi represents the score variance in the specific 
dimension. Institutional distance was measured building on the approach of Gaur et al. (2007) 
and Xu, Pan, and Beamish (2004). The institutional dimensions found in the Executive 
Opinion Survey of the Global Competitiveness Report (2005) were explored, and a factor 
analysis was conducted (principal component with varimax rotation and Kaiser 
normalization). The institutional environment is captured by a seven-item construct that 
loaded on a single factor having a coefficient alpha of 0.961. This data was matched to our 
data calculating the institutional distance between the host countries of the sending and 
receiving subsidiaries. The relative economic differences were captured by estimating 
differences in GDP per capita between the host countries of the subsidiaries (Tsang and Yip, 
2007). Data was obtained through the Total Economy Database (2006). Following Tsang and 
Yip (2007), we created a measure for relatively more developed countries in relation to the 
other part of the dyad. This measure can be expressed as:  
 
ln(GDPsender)-ln(GDPreciever) if GDPsender ≥ GDPreciever and = 0 if GDPsender < GDPreceiver 
 
Common method bias and multicollinearity 
The use of perceptual measurements can be problematic because of social desirability and 
self-assessment bias. This is mitigated by the face-to-face interviews. In order to check for 
common method bias augmenting the relationships, Harman’s one-factor test was used 
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(Podsakoff and Organ, 1986). All relevant indicators were included in a principal component 
factor analysis (principal component with varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization, see 
Table 1). The 0.638 KMO value exceeded the recommended 0.6 level (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
2001). The Bartlett’s test of sphericity was at a 0.001 significance level, indicating sufficient 
correlations between the indicators (Hair et al., 2006) and factor analysis procedure 
appropriateness. The factor analysis indicated data validity and reported good properties. If 
high common method variance is a problem, only one factor will emerge with an eigenvalue 
exceeding 1 or, alternatively, one of the factors extracted will account for a majority of the 
variance. In the principal component analysis, six factors were extracted with eigenvalues 
above 1. The seventh factor returned with an eigenvalue of 0.837, thus being far from meeting 
the latent root criterion and, consequently, not included in the analysis.  
 None of the factors explain a majority of the variance, ranging from 6.446 percent to 
19.950 percent. The cumulative variance explained by the seven factors was 71.840 percent. 
In the rotated factor solution, a cutoff value of 0.32 was used, and only two cross-loadings 
appeared above this level. Factor loadings below 0.32 can be considered poor since the 
overlapping variance then is below 10 percent; and a factor loading of 0.45 represents 20 
percent of the overlapping variance and can be considered fair (Comrey and Lee, 1992). The 
first cross-loading occurred for the item of headquarters’ instruction to share the innovation 
with the counterpart on the construct of headquarters’ participation during the development 
with a value of 0.436. The second cross-loading relates to the respondents reporting whether 
the innovation transfer occurred without any sanctions from headquarters (reversed), with a 
value of 0.324 on the construct of headquarters’ participation during the development. 
However, both items loaded with higher values on the headquarters hierarchical governance 
tool construct. These two cross-loadings do not factor when interpreting the data, even though 
the presence of common method bias cannot entirely be ruled out. 
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Following Lindell and Whitney (2001), we introduced a marker variable to further test 
for common method variance,. This technique has been argued to be an effective tool for 
accounting for common method variance (Malhotra, Kim, and Patil, 2006). The marker 
variable should be measured by the same questionnaire as for the other variables. However, 
the marker variable should be theoretically unrelated to the relevant perceptual variables. 
From the questionnaire, the respondents’ answer to the following question was used: rate the 
level of usage of logistics data during the development of the innovation (on a scale ranging 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very high)). This question was selected since there did not seem to be 
any theoretical reason why it should be related to the variables in the conceptual model. 
Additionally, this variable was measured in the same way as the other perceptual measures. 
We controlled for any effect of the marker variable on the partial correlations of the 
perceptual variables. All significant correlations remained the same, and the marker variable 
did not significantly correlate with any of the perceptual measures. Thus, this additional test 
for common method variance ensures that it is not likely to affect the estimation outcomes. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table I here 
---------------------------------- 
 
To investigate whether there is a correlation between two or more predictor variables 
augmenting the estimated R2 of the model, the variance inflation factor (VIF) was calculated. 
Different acceptable VIF value sizes have been proposed, and there does not seem to be a 
consensus of what cutoff value to use, although 5 has been suggested as a reasonable number 
(Studenmund, 1992). No VIF values in any of the models exceeded 5. In Model 2, the highest 
calculated VIF value was 1.963, with a mean of 1.450. Consequently, multicollinearity does 
not seem to threaten the model estimates, and this should not distort the regression model 
results. 
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RESULTS 
The mean values, standard deviations, and correlation matrix for all the variables are 
presented in Table 2. The highest correlation is 0.635 (p < 0.01) between physical and cultural 
distance. However, it is to be expected that the distance dimensions are highly correlated. 
The article examines how different organizational mechanisms affect knowledge 
transfer effectiveness. In order to estimate the models, ordinary least squares regressions were 
used. In the second specification, all independent variables were entered. In Table 3, the 
standardized parameter estimates of all models are reported. The first model returned 
significant with an F-value of 3.519 (p < 0.01), and the control variables explained 24.9 
percent of the variance. Model 2 is significant with an F-value of 3.915 (p < 0.01) and an R2-
value of 0.368. Hence, both models are significant and the explanatory value increases 
between model specifications (see diagnostics in Table 3). In order to control for potential 
industry effects, we ran a post hoc analysis including industry dummies. This analysis 
suggests that industry differences are not influencing estimate outcomes. 
This supports the chosen model specifications and no VIF values are abnormally large 
in any of the models, indicating that multicollinearity does not augment the R2 value or the 
model’s predictive capability. We employed the Ramsey reset test to investigate whether 
nonlinear alterations of the independent variables would yield a higher adjusted R2. The 
outcome suggested that the models are better without introducing power alterations. 
Additionally, we plotted the residuals to see if nonconstant variance was present across 
different independent variable values. No heteroskedasticity problem was detected. 
The findings indicate a very small influence of headquarters' involvement during the 
development of the innovation, and the relationship is insignificant. Hence, no support is 
found for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2, which relates to whether the transfer was driven by 
headquarters' hierarchical governance tools, showed a significant (p < 0.01) negative 
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relationship to transfer performance effectiveness in Model 2. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is 
supported. Contrary to what was postulated in Hypothesis 3, using subsidiary expatriates 
indicates a significant (p < 0.01) negative relationship to transfer performance in Model 2. 
Hence, Hypothesis 3 is not supported.6 Established relationships are positively (p < 0.05) 
related to knowledge transfer effectiveness, thus lending support to Hypothesis 4. Finally, 
relationship building has a small positive effect on transfer effectiveness. However, this 
relationship is not significant and Hypothesis 5 is consequently not supported.  
 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Tables II and III here 
---------------------------------- 
 
DISCUSSION 
This article set out to fill the research gap on the influence of formal hierarchical governance 
tools and lateral relationships on transferred knowledge utilization, that is, transfer 
effectiveness. A major contribution of this study is the focus on effectiveness in specific 
transfer projects related to hierarchy and relationships within the MNE. This allows for a 
better understanding of hierarchical and lateral tools for effective knowledge governance. The 
knowledge governance approach (Foss, 2007) holds that an organizational action to influence 
knowledge transfer should start with formal mechanisms since these are readily available to 
managers. However, informal mechanisms also affect the transfer. The idea is that the formal 
mechanisms influence behavior, thus enabling satisfactory transfer performance. Building on 
this approach, our article deals with two formal tools employed by headquarters, one formal 
6 The result pertaining to subsidiary expatriates is especially notable and opposed to our expectations. In order to 
further understand this result from an empirical point of view, we ran additional models as post hoc tests with the 
subsidiary expatriates variable interacting with the patenting variable, as well as with the established relationship 
variable. This is based on the reasoning that since expatriates may be more useful for transferring tacit 
knowledge, patents might moderate their value. Moreover, expatriates from a familiar source might be more 
useful and may, consequently, also moderate their effect. However, when running additional tests for these 
effects, the moderations return insignificant. Additionally, the model does not get significantly better with any of 
the moderation effects included. This is consistent with the results from the Ramsey reset test. 
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control tool employed in the sending-receiving relationship, and two lateral relationship 
characteristics of a more informal nature that may govern the knowledge transfer process. The 
results suggest that, in general, hierarchical and formal governance tools are not positively 
related to transfer effectiveness, but that lateral relationships affect transfer effectiveness 
positively. This enables us to advance the understanding of headquarters' role and function in 
knowledge transfer projects and the benefits of using lateral relationship building. This 
informs us about the role of headquarters and subsidiaries within the knowledge-based view 
and how this relates to knowledge governance. Moran and Ghoshal (1999: 395) highlighted 
the importance of facilitating, 'the continual reallocation of resources to more productive 
uses.' This study emphasize effective knowledge governance for realizing the value of 
knowledge exchange between units and, thereby, contributes to the knowledge-based view by 
analyzing antecedents to effective use of transferred knowledge. 
Hierarchy in the MNE 
In line with our expectations, a significant negative effect on knowledge utilization is found 
when headquarters drives the transfer process through formal tools. This may be due to actors 
feeling forced into action without any real motivation, and it might be irrelevant knowledge 
that is being transferred to the receiver, i.e., the motivational disposition of the subsidiaries 
toward the transfer is low, which impedes integration and use. Thus, a transfer process 
between subsidiaries that is initiated and required by headquarters is going to be less 
effective. 
Even though headquarters may have both value creation and cost control in mind, its 
focus is more likely to be on efficiency rather than effectiveness because it is easier to 
measure and follow-up, thus offering one explanation of the negative result vis-à-vis 
effectiveness (Daft, 1992; Kostova and Roth, 2002). Another explanation may be that 
headquarters involves itself in problematic transfers. For managers, this points out that 
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classical, easily available control tools may not always be appropriate in ensuring that 
knowledge is adopted, integrated, and used at the receiving subsidiary. Thus, our results 
indicate that the role of headquarters as a knowledge webmaster tasked with assembling the 
global company and enabling self-renewal is indeed challenging (Tallman and Koza, 2010). 
Command and control seems to be an ineffective headquarters strategy with respect to 
knowledge transfer effectiveness. 
A surprising finding is the insignificant effect of headquarters’ involvement during the 
knowledge development on the subsequent utilization of the knowledge when transferred to 
another unit. The involvement of headquarters can be perceived as a distinctly different 
governance tool compared to monitoring and control with a different rationale and 
performance effect. In some cases, headquarters needs to be involved and to support 
promising subsidiary developments (Rugman and Verbeke, 2001). Even though involvement 
does not have a direct effect on transfer performance effectiveness, the indirect effects of 
headquarters involvement may be great. For example, the foundations for organizational 
influence can potentially be traced back to headquarters’ involvement in subsidiary-level 
activities. Also, the perception of the subsidiary as an important player in the MNE network is 
increased as a result of headquarters involvement (Ciabuschi et al., 2011b). Our model does 
not consider this political power balance and evolution within the MNE, but it at least 
indicates that no significant detrimental effect of involvement during development can be 
found with respect to transfer effectiveness. Thus, with respect to headquarters' tools for 
effective knowledge governance, our findings indicate that there may be a difference between 
formal policy and support for innovative activities within subsidiaries compared to direct 
transactional governance. In some cases, headquarters interference in subsidiary operations is 
likely to create, rather than solve, knowledge transfer problems (Tallman and Chacar, 2011; 
Tallman and Koza, 2010). 
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Subsidiary expatriates 
A surprising finding relates to the negative effect of expatriates for the utilization of 
transferred knowledge. In fact, correlating the individual items making up the expatriate 
construct with transfer effectiveness shows significant and negative correlations for both 
items. As discussed by Björkman et al. (2004), the expatriate role needs to be further 
researched. In their study, they found no effect of expatriates on knowledge outflow. One 
reason behind the current negative transfer effect may be that it is easier to evaluate financial 
performance and cost, that is, efficiency, than the extent to which knowledge is used and 
integrated, that is, effectiveness. Hence, expatriates are more likely to have a focus similar to 
that of headquarters rather than a subsidiary focus on implementing and using the knowledge 
in order to improve the operations in the long run at the recipient (Björkman et al., 2004). 
Moreover, as suggested by Tallman and Chacar (2011), knowledge transfer mechanisms 
should be considered at the level of communities and networks of practice, implying that 
social ties facilitate learning. However, the conditions for a positive outcome of such social 
ties are that individuals have, for instance, similar training and objectives, as well as shared 
professional norms. In our setting, this may translate into considering whether the 'right' or 
'wrong' expatriates are used for the specific knowledge utilization setting.  
 As argued by Tallman and Chacar (2011), it is easy to disrupt social ties; if that is the 
case, a problematic situation for knowledge utilization may emerge. Our results indicate that 
expatriate managers do not always facilitate transfer effectiveness, as they often lack 
sufficient understanding about how the transferred knowledge should be implemented and 
used at the receiving unit. Instead, path dependencies, in terms of established relationships 
and unit similarity, lead to transfer effectiveness. This highlights the importance of 
organizational and personal relationships that are established over time (Buckley and Carter, 
1999, 2004). Parachuting 'strangers' into a social process does not appear to be successful. 
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Our post hoc test does not, however, indicate a significant positive moderation effect between 
expatriates and established relationships. For research on expatriates, it seems important to 
consider what an appropriate expatriate in a particular setting is in order to create 
communities and networks of practices that facilitate conditions for learning (Tallman and 
Chacar, 2011). 
Another explanation of this notable finding might be the receiving subsidiary’s 
increasing (perceived) dependence on the sending unit when expatriates are used. In their 
seminal study of organizational practice transfers, Kostova and Roth (2002) found a negative 
relation between subunits’ perceived headquarters dependence and practice implementation. 
Along somewhat similar lines of reasoning, expatriates from the sending subsidiary increase 
the receiving subsidiary’s dependence on this unit and, therefore, make the adaption and 
utilization of the transferred knowledge more arduous than otherwise. As the utilization and 
adoption of transferred knowledge normally entail some modification and adaptation to work 
smoothly in a new setting, the increased dependence, implying subordination and control 
from the expatriates, might circumscribe the needed flexibility for utilizing and adopting the 
knowledge fully and, thereby, produce the negative relation between expatriates and transfer 
effectiveness (Kostova and Roth, 2002). 
 Finally, it may be that subsidiaries make use of expatriates only in transfer processes 
they believe will be very difficult to carry out. Thus, it may be that the additional cost of using 
expatriates in a transfer process for adopting and utilizing the transferred knowledge is 
incurred only in cases that are expected to be difficult. It is then natural to receive a negative 
result on performance, but we can only speculate that the negative result would have been 
even stronger if expatriates had not been used. This remains open for future research. 
 
Subsidiary lateral relationships 
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Turning to lateral relationships, the results indicate that the utilization of transferred 
knowledge is achieved in situations where the transfer occurs in established relationships. It is 
important to cooperate with partners that the actors already know and trust and with whom 
they have working experience. Our results indicate that this facilitates knowledge adoption 
and use. Highlighting the importance of already-established relationships compared to 
building relationships contributes to understanding how knowledge can be governed 
effectively. This supplements reasoning highlighting the importance of long-standing 
relationships and the accumulation of specific exchange process experiences (Mayer and 
Argyres, 2004; Zollo, Reuer, and Singh, 2002). Hence, it becomes a matter of selecting the 
transfer counterparts carefully if success is to be achieved, not to transfer the knowledge to 
just anyone.  
 Selecting the transfer counterparts carefully makes better use of available resources and 
will help the subsidiaries govern their knowledge transfer processes. Looking at transfer 
performance effectiveness allows for a deeper understanding that is not gained by viewing 
successful transfer simply as the extent of flows between units. By cooperating with known 
counterparts, the subsidiary builds specific dyadic knowledge transfer experience and 
knowledge. The relationship partners learn how to organize and conduct knowledge transfer 
within the dyadic relationship, i.e., an evolutionary process of tacit capability development 
takes place (Nelson and Winter, 1982). This capability is connected to specific relationships 
and lends support to the idea of the MNE as a social community (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 
1993). These findings connect well with the relational governance approach discussed by 
Poppo et al. (2008), where exchange is governed by cooperative norms and collaborative 
activities. Organizational economics also acknowledges informal social relationships as 
governance tools, often in the form of trust (Williamson, 1994; Woolthius, Hillebrand, and 
Nooteboom, 2005). Hierarchical governance can sometimes be substituted by or 
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complemented with relational arrangements (Woolthius et al., 2005); in the current 
framework, this translates as subsidiaries’ governing knowledge. Thus, relational governance 
can be an effective process aimed at increasing subsidiary-level capabilities, i.e., knowledge 
transfer effectiveness. 
 The disappointing nonsignificant result for relationship building may have occurred 
because the variables that make up this construct (temporary training, cross-units teams, and 
face-to-face meetings) can all be seen as precursors of long-standing relationships and may 
pay off only in the future. These may be considered investments in strengthening and 
establishing relationships that pay off in future knowledge transfer effectiveness as our result 
for ‘established relationships’ show. This has to remain an important conjecture requiring 
careful longitudinal investigation. 
Limitations and directions for future research 
One major limitation of the study is that the data originates only from the sending subsidiary. 
In order to estimate transfer performance in a more holistic way, dyadic data needs to be 
collected. However, since the sending subsidiary is actively involved during the transfer, it is 
reasonable to assume that the targeted respondents gave an accurate estimation of both 
headquarters’ role, the dyadic relationship, and how well the knowledge was implemented 
and adopted at the receiving subsidiary.7 Moreover, the respondent had usually been involved 
in multiple transfer projects (encompassing the same innovation), which allowed for cross-
project comparison. Some of the measurements consist of subjective estimations made by the 
respondents, which can be problematic because of social desirability and self-assessment 
biases. However, this is mediated by the fact that our data is collected from key informants 
through face-to-face interviews.  
7 In fact, our t-test of one item from the dependent variable where we have dyadic data confirms this notion. 
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 In terms of future research, the interplay between efficiency and effectiveness needs to 
be better understood, as does the indirect effects of headquarters’ involvement in subsidiary-
level activities. The role of expatriates and incentive systems and their potential contribution 
to transfer performance needs to be further investigated since prior studies found mixed 
results (Björkman et al., 2004; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000). This study is cross-sectional, 
and longitudinal research is required to test the dynamic proposition that relationship building 
leads to future knowledge transfer effectiveness through establishing strong relationships. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS  
The contribution of this article is twofold; first, a more in-depth knowledge transfer 
performance measure (effectiveness in terms of adoption and use) is employed compared to 
previous studies that have focused more on aggregated knowledge flows (Agrawal et al., 
2008; Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Haas and Hansen, 2005; Schulz 2001). We have 
analyzed the performance variation in individual knowledge transfer projects and shed light 
on the reasons for this variation. Second, we show the importance of considering both 
hierarchical governance tools and lateral relationships, as they influence knowledge utilization 
simultaneously and in different ways. This directly contributes to an enhanced understanding 
of knowledge governance and the knowledge-based view. 
The results indicate that headquarters’ involvement during knowledge development 
does not have any impact on subsequent transfer effectiveness, whereas more formal 
hierarchical governance forms have a negative impact. We suggest that relational 
characteristics are preferable for building subsidiary capabilities in knowledge transfers. 
Similarly, the use of expatriates may be disruptive to an essentially social process. 
Consequently, this article augments the understanding of knowledge governance and 
integration in large international organizations.  
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 Table 1. Factor analysis with varimax rotation 
Variable 
Factor 
loading  Communality 
Factor 1: HEADQUARTERS INVOLVEMENT IN DEVELOPMENT    
The MNE HQ has participated closely in developing this innovation 0.913  0.872 
The MNE HQ has brought competence of use for the development of this 
innovation 0.864  0.814 
The MNE HQ has been important through specifying requests 0.899  0.832 
The MNE HQ has taken important initiatives for developing the 
innovation 0.785  0.678 
Eigenvalue  3.790  
% Variance  19.950  
Factor 2: TRANSFER PERFORMANCE EFFECTIVENESS    
The counterpart adopted the innovation very quickly 0.649  0.512 
The innovation has been very easy to adopt by this counterpart 0.836  0.720 
The performance of the innovation transfer was very satisfactory 0.811  0.692 
To what extent the innovation transfer has been completed 0.813  0.688 
Eigenvalue  3.154  
% Variance  16.600  
Factor 3: HEADQUARTERS HIERARCICHAL GOVERNANCE TOOLS    
The MNE HQ has formally instructed you to share this innovation with 
the counterpart 0.526  0.519 
The transfer of the innovation has occurred without any sanctions by HQ 
with the counterpart (Reversed) 0.561  0.610 
Requirement from HQ 0.811  0.716 
HQ evaluation system 0.686  0.575 
Eigenvalue  2.350  
% Variance  12.367  
Factor 4: RELATIONSHIP BUILDING    
Temporary training at partner sites 0.790  0.729 
Cross-unit teams, project groups, etc. 0.806  0.764 
Face-to-face meetings  0.761  0.679 
Eigenvalue  1.847  
% Variance  9.720  
Factor 5: ESTABLISHED RELATIONSHIP    
They previously cooperated with the receiver 0.867  0.811 
They previously had shared knowledge 0.823  0.801 
Eigenvalue  1.284  
% Variance  6.757  
Factor 6: SUBSIDIARY EXPATRIATES    
To what extent, with regard to the transfer of the innovation, exchange of 
managers, was used 0.881  0.837 
To what extent the transfer of the innovation was driven by moving 
personnel between the developer and the receiver 0.817  0.802 
Eigenvalue  1.225  
% Variance  6.446  
Total variance explained  71.840  
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Table 2. Correlation and descriptive statistics 
 MEAN S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. Transfer performance effectiveness 5.211 1.312 1                
2. Age 3.528 0.903 0.036 1               
3. Size 5.414 1.590 0.041 0.112 1              
4. Basic research 0.555 0.498 0.132 0.402** 0.224** 1             
5. Knowledge sharing 4.148 1.774 0.147 0.081 0.272** 0.173* 1            
6. Unit similarity 5.557 1.55271 0.465** -0.213** -0.158 -0.060 0.002 1           
7. Patent 0.569 0.496 -0.111 -0.102 -0.212** 0.019 -0.240** 0.093 1          
8. Physical distance 5.735 3.578 -0.001 -0.008 0.024 -0.035 -0.062 0.016 0.051 1         
9. Cultural distance 0.618 0.809 0.015 0.049 -0.148 -0.012 -0.023 0.052 0.106 0.635** 1        
10. Institutional distance 0.491 0.572 0.041 -0.114 0.059 -0.025 -0.147 -0.057 -0.070 0.464** 0.379** 1       
11. Economic differences 0.052 0.124 0.067 -0.067 0.060 -0.008 0.209** 0.052 -0.007 0.391** 0.270** -0.042 1      
12. Headquarters involvement in dev. 2.110 1.580 -0.147 -0.350** -0.149* -0.182* 0.005 0.099 0.024 0.073 0.080 -0.057 0.150 1     
13. Headquarters hierarchical tools 2.601 1.569 -0.039 0.056 0.324** 0.228** 0.169 -0.054 -0.180* 0.048 0.123 -0.020 0.150 0.348** 1    
14. Subsidiary expatriates 1.893 1.472 -0.390** -0.042 -0.064 -0.137 0.032 -0.264** 0.034 -0.049 -0.037 -0.026 -0.150 0.081 -0.098 1   
15. Established relationship 4.777 1.660 0.289** 0.085 0.046 0.007 0.151 0.255** 0.074 -0.110 0.009 -0.202** 0.002 -0.039 0.108 -0.028 1  
16. Relationship building 4.025 1.753 -0.004 0.000 -0.016 -0.020 -0.056 -0.037 0.012 -0.138 -0.167* -0.059 -0.185* 0.241** 0.093 0.175* 0.256** 1 
VIF value 1.450 - - 1.597 1.629 1.433 1.277 1.310 1.271 1.963 1.585 1.409 1.478 1.508 1.528 1.185 1.336 1.246 
  
                 
Spearman’s correlation  
                 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two tailed). 
                
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two tailed). 
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Table 3. Results from the ordinary least squares regression analysis a 
 
Regressor                  Model 1     Model 2          
     β   s.e.     β   s.e. 
Age 0.068 0.143 -0.006 0.145 
Size 0.038 0.079 0.085 0.083 
Basic research 0.129 0.256 0.114 0.250 
Knowledge sharing 0.055 0.070 0.062 0.066 
Patent -0.153† 0.244 -0.202* 0.236 
Unit similarity 0.471*** 0.075 0.368*** 0.077 
Physical distance 0.015 0.042 -0.019 0.041 
Cultural distance -0.065 0.166 -0.010 0.162 
Institutional distance 0.011 0.224 0.071 0.216 
Economic differences 0.053 1.035 0.075 1.020 
Headquarters involvement in development - - -0.002 0.081 
Headquarters hierarchical governance tools - - -0.240** 0.082 
Subsidiary expatriates - - -0.239** 0.077 
Established relationship - - 0.211* 0.072 
Relationship building - - 0.039 0.066 
Diagnostics     
N 169 169 
R2 0.249 0.368 
Adj.R2 0.178 0.274 
Δ R2 0.249 0.118 
F-statistics 3.519*** 3.915*** 
a Values are standardized parameter estimates. 
†p < 0.1, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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